When Michael Gove announced that he would not be a candidate in the forthcoming election the reaction was as eclectic as the man himself. There was some of the critical commentary that always accompanies the end of a long and contentious political career, and Gove’s “had enough of experts” line continues to haunt him. But both supporters and opponents recognised that Gove has been one of the more consequential government ministers of the last 14 years.

The question of why Gove, rare among recent ministers, was seemingly able to grip the civil service and land some real change is one that should exercise an incoming government after the general election.

Different ministers and civil servants will have their own views on what worked, and what did not, about the way Gove managed the departments he led. I worked in Defra when Gove was secretary of state, and also observed his approach from the cabinet secretary’s office in the centre of government. So here, as a public service to new ministers, is an assessment of the Gove governing method.

Six lessons from the Michael Gove method

First, Gove transmitted a sense of fun and opportunity, showing officials and advisers that they had a chance to do and to change things. Gove made the departments he led places of energy and excitement – using journalistic verve to rally the troops, sell his agenda and persuade people that chronic and knotty problems could be addressed.

Second, he took the time to understand problems and opportunities before setting strategy and taking key decisions. That meant Gove arrived at refreshing and sometimes unexpected policy solutions – prison reform being a case in point – or built on previous Labour successes when the politically expedient thing might have been to drop them. But once he had established a position he urged speed, warning that “there is always less time than you think”.

Third, he was prepared to pick fights and, once they were picked, commit to them. He took on the Treasury in particular, spending political capital in rows over his priorities. He was also prepared to use the collective agreement process inside government to amend and block policies even beyond his area of responsibility. And outside government he was willing to be unpopular as education secretary to the extent that David Cameron felt that he had to move him to a less high profile job. 

Fourth, Gove’s approach evolved over time. At the Department for Education he had a clear agenda and pushed through his reform mission against external opposition. But having made public enemies in the education sector, at the Ministry of Justice, in Defra and the 'Levelling Up' department, Gove learnt from the problems his antagonistic approach had caused, and took a different tack. Here he was able to harness external support and co-opted potential opponents – like the National Farmer’s Union on food policy, or the Howard League for Penal Reform on justice policy. He used the external coalitions he built to back up his policy arguments with other departments (and sometimes inside his own department).

Fifth, in each department Gove managed to find under-appreciated corners of potential political or bureaucratic power, built them up and used them to pursue his objectives. Gove understood that he could leverage non-executive directors, appoint new civil service policy advisers and influence other appointments.

Sixth, Gove generally welcomed challenge, encouraged debate and wanted his political and civil service advisers to give honest advice. But he kept his cards close until reaching a decision – with close advisers sometimes unsure about which side of an argument would win out.