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The USGS Healy breaks ice around Renda, a Russian tanker, 250 miles south of Nome, Alaska in January 2012. Photo: U.S. Department of Defense

The Arctic, often associated with serene landscapes and wildlife, is not just a picturesque region but a strategically important area shaped by environmental, political, economic, and military forces. During the Cold War, it was a battleground between the United States (US), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Post-Cold War, Arctic nations sought to preserve it as a zone of cooperation.¹⁾Congressional Research Service (2024) Changes in the Arctic: Background and issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. 01 October, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf. Accessed on 1 November 2024 However, the strategic competition among the US, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has significantly elevated its geopolitical importance in the past decade. The military advancements of Russia and PRC, in contrast to slower efforts by the US and NATO, have turned the Arctic into a critical focus for security, resource access, and control over emerging shipping routes.

In 2009, global interest in the Arctic surged when the US Geological Survey estimated the Arctic held 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of the world’s natural gas.²⁾Sharma A (2021) China’s Polar Silk Road: Implications for the Arctic Region. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 25 October, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2820750/chinas-polar-silk-road-implications-for-the-arctic-region. Accessed on 1 November 2024 That same year, the US hosted the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting to reaffirm cooperation. When Russia asserted its claims over arctic territory, the tone shifted from collaboration to competition. Russia’s tenor was not unprecedented; in 2007, Russian submarines planted a Russian flag on the North Pole, proclaiming, “The Arctic is Russian.”³⁾Parfitt T (2007) Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed. The Guardian, 02 August, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic. Accessed on 4 November 2024

The 2013 launch of the US National Strategy for the Arctic Region set the stage for today’s geopolitical landscape. By 2022, Russian militarism and PRC’s ‘Polar Silk Road’ ambitions prompted the US to update its Arctic strategy, emphasizing military readiness, infrastructure, and NATO collaboration.⁴⁾White House (2022) National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The White House, October, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2024 The Biden administration further prioritized investments in icebreakers, climate action, and Indigenous involvement, striking a delicate balance between national security and sustainable development in this increasingly contested region.⁵⁾White House (2022) National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The White House, October, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2024

Background

Since 2009, the US has issued several Arctic policy documents. The 2009 Arctic Region Policy Directive marked a significant shift in US assessment by recognizing the Arctic’s importance, particularly in terms of energy and security.⁶⁾Huebert R (2009) US Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power. University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy, 2(2): 189–225. Accessed on 31 October 2024 The 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region highlighted energy and US security, environmental preservation, freedom of navigation, access to resources, commerce protection, and peaceful resolution.⁷⁾White House (2013) 2013 National Strategy for Arctic Region. The White House. May, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2024

The 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region was more urgent. Marie-Anne Coninsx, a senior fellow at the Egmont Institute and former EU Ambassador (Arctic), noted that in prior years, US Arctic commitment was “not high on the US Federal Agenda.”⁸⁾Coninsx M (2022) The New US Arctic Strategy. Welcome Back, America!. Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, 15 December, https://www.egmontinstitute.be/the-new-us-arctic-strategy-welcome-back-america. Accessed on 5 November 2024 The Strategy marked a shift in US policy, acknowledging the Arctic as a critical and addressing challenges that had emerged since 2013. It identified four key Pillars: security, climate change/protection, sustainable development, and international governance.⁹⁾White House (2022) National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The White House, October, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2024 The strategy emphasized climate change and investing in sustainable development while increasing capabilities to prevent threats to the US and its allies.¹⁰⁾White House (2022) National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The White House, October, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2024 Furthermore, it recognized the heightened strategic competition in the Arctic, exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.¹¹⁾White House (2022) National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The White House, October, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2024 In 2023, US Army General VanHerck advocated to Congress the urgent need for a focused Arctic Strategy, enhanced domain awareness, and the creation of a comprehensive defense framework as these challenges were being driven further by advancing climate change and rising security challenges.¹²⁾Roza D (2023) NORAD Boss asks Congress for Better Domain Awareness. Air & Space Forces Magazine, 23 March, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/norad-radar-china-balloon-congress. Accessed on 4 November 2024

The 2024 Department of Defense (DoD) Arctic Strategy further recognizes the Arctic’s growing importance due to climate change, geopolitical shifts, and increasing great-power competition and directs the DoD to “enhance its Arctic capabilities, deepen engagement with Allies and partners, and exercise our forces to build readiness for operations at high latitudes.”¹³⁾US Department of Defense (2024) 2024 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy. Department of Defense, June, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Accessed on 19 December It highlights critical defense objectives, including protecting US sovereignty, maintaining stability, and ensuring the Arctic’s role as a secure avenue for power projection. The 2024 Strategy includes specific initiatives such as enhanced domain awareness; increased communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; better understanding of cold-weather operations; and conducting key routine training alongside US allies to strengthen joint capabilities.¹⁴⁾US Department of Defense (2024) 2024 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy. Department of Defense, June, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Accessed on 19 December The strategy emphasizes cooperation with, and participation of, Arctic nations and Indigenous communities. It underscores climate adaptation measures. Through these efforts, the DoD seeks to maintain a “monitor-and-respond” posture, ensuring the Arctic remains peaceful while adapting to dynamic environmental and security conditions.

Climate change and security

Climate change has rapidly transformed the Arctic, making previously inaccessible areas more available for economic and strategic use. The North Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage (NWP) could become economically viable by 2023,¹⁵⁾Pincus R (2020) Three-way power dynamics in the Arctic. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 14(1): 40-63, Spring, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26891883. Accessed on 4 November 2024 potentially diverting traffic from the Suez Canal. As access to critical resources expands, states will shift strategies and intensify competition over the Arctic’s growing economic and military significance. This competition has also been driven by its militarization.¹⁶⁾Pincus R (2020) Three-way power dynamics in the Arctic. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 14(1): 40-63, Spring, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26891883. Accessed on 4 November 2024 Over the past decade, Russia has modernized its Arctic military bases, deployed defense missiles, and upgraded its submarine fleet while developing fisheries, petroleum, and mineral extraction.¹⁷⁾White House (2022) National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The White House, October, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2024 Russia’s restrictive NSR claims have further escalated tensions, especially following its invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, PRC signaled growing ambitions having ramped up its Arctic investments, researched military applications, and expanded its icebreaker fleet.¹⁸⁾White House (2022) National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The White House, October, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2024 These developments highlight the Arctic’s evolving role in economic opportunity and strategic rivalry, posing significant challenges to US grand strategy.

American Grand Strategy

The 2009 Arctic Region Policy shifted away from the apathetic post-Cold War US Arctic strategy, recognizing the Arctic as an emerging critical region but only identified two focal points: energy and security.¹⁹⁾Huebert R (2009) US Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power. University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy, 2(2): 189–225. Accessed on 31 October 2024 The 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region was comprehensive, addressing the Pillars of security, climate change/environmental protection, sustainable development, and international governance. Changes in the physical, financial, and geopolitical landscape have shifted American grand strategy in the Arctic, ending the previous three decades of stability following the Cold War and reflecting rising geopolitical tensions between Russia and Arctic stakeholders.

Energy

The US is vested in the Arctic’s oil and natural gas, with Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay Oil Field being North America’s most prominent; in the 2000s, Prudhoe Bay typically produced about 8% of America’s domestic oil.²⁰⁾Clifford K and Peters JW (2006) Lessons from Prudoe Bay. New York Times, 09 August,https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/opinion/09wed2.html. Accessed on 4 November 2024 The importance of Arctic oil to America’s energy independence was demonstrated in 2006 when a leak in a critical pipeline at Prudhoe Bay forced the line’s shutdown while the US and Iran were in a dispute. At the same time, tensions in the Middle East made it difficult for the US to buy reasonably priced foreign oil. The total cost of oil increased 3% domestically.²¹⁾Clifford K and Peters JW (2006) Lessons from Prudoe Bay. New York Times, 09 August,https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/opinion/09wed2.html. Accessed on 4 November 2024

The 2009 Arctic Region Policy aimed to increase US oil independence by accessing Alaskan oil deposits. While it received support from energy independence advocates, it was also met with resistance from environmentalists, thus hindering implementation.²²⁾Huebert R (2009) US Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power. University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy, 2(2): 189–225. Accessed on 31 October 2024 This debate persisted over the years, shaping subsequent approaches to Arctic resource development. The Trump administration (2021) issued drilling leases on more than 400,000 acres in Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.²³⁾Groom N (2021) Trump Administration Issues Last-Minute Arctic Refuge Drilling Leases. Reuters, 21 January, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us/trump-administration-issues-last-minute-arctic-refuge-drilling-leases-idUSKBN29O2K4/. Accessed on 5 November 2024 In contrast, the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic acknowledges the region’s economic reliance on hydrocarbon production while advocating for economic diversification, a transition to green energy and environmental protection.²⁴⁾White House (2022) National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The White House, October, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2024 In 2024, the US Department of the Interior denied commercial access to a copper deposit through Gates of the Arctic National Park. It banned oil drilling in half of the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska.²⁵⁾Friedman O (2024) Biden Shields Millions of Acres of Alaskan Wilderness From Drilling and Mining. The New York Times, 19 April, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/19/climate/biden-alaska-drilling-mining-nrpa.html. Accessed on 4 November 2024 Environmentalists and tribal leaders praised these decisions, but Alaska’s officials criticized them.²⁶⁾Friedman O (2024) Biden Shields Millions of Acres of Alaskan Wilderness From Drilling and Mining. The New York Times, 19 April, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/19/climate/biden-alaska-drilling-mining-nrpa.html. Accessed on 4 November 2024

The relationship between environmentalism and energy complicates the US grand strategy in the Arctic, creating inconsistency due to fluctuating politics, public opinion, and stakeholder support. This makes long-term planning for Arctic energy difficult, as leadership changes can shift priorities between resource extraction and environmental protections and alter the trajectory of US Arctic strategy. Such volatility hampers coherent, long-term policies essential for the region’s energy security and ecological sustainability, making it a contentious issue influenced by electoral outcomes and shifting public opinion.

Security

The 2009 US Arctic Region Policy’s focus on security has evolved significantly. Previously, the US emphasized unilateral security and preferred bilateral agreements to regional cooperation while ignoring Arctic issues.²⁷⁾Huebert R (2009) US Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power. University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy, 2(2): 189–225. Accessed on 31 October 2024 Post-Cold War, Russia expanded its presence in the Arctic, reverting to Cold War norms. In response, the 2022 National Strategy now prioritizes American people and sovereign territory and rights, committing to enhance capabilities through infrastructure improvements, including an expanded icebreaker fleet, and strengthening cooperation with Arctic allies against Russian aggression.²⁸⁾White House (2022) National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The White House, October, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2024

In his 1987 Murmansk speech, Mikhail Gorbachev described the Arctic as a “peace and cooperation zone,” emphasizing collaboration over competition.²⁹⁾Boulègue M (2019) Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic Managing Hard Power in a ‘Low Tension’ Environment. Chatham House, 28 June, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-28-Russia-Military-Arctic.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2024 However during the 2000s, in response to an increased perception of NATO’s Arctic presence and strategic importance, Russia began militarizing the region, seeking to reclaim its superpower status after the Soviet Union’s collapse.³⁰⁾Boulègue M (2019) Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic Managing Hard Power in a ‘Low Tension’ Environment. Chatham House, 28 June, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-28-Russia-Military-Arctic.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2024 By 2019, Russia had established 14 airfields, six military bases, refurbished 16 Soviet-era deep-water ports, and 10 border posts in the Arctic, with its Northern Fleet boasting an estimated 120 ships, including 40 icebreakers.³¹⁾Postler A (2019) Contextualizing Russia’s Arctic Militarization. Georgetown Security Studies Review, 18 February, https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2019/02/18/contextualizing-russias-arctic-militarization/. Accessed on 4 November 2024 Russia allowed PRC to construct docks at five of the most significant ports along Russia’s Arctic coastline.³²⁾Filijović M and Jardine S (2024) Russia’s Queenside Castling in the High North: A Strategic Risk or Opportunity for the West?. The Arctic Institute, 08 October, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-queenside-castling-high-north-strategic-risk-opportunity-west/. Accessed on 4 November 2024 In contrast, the US needs to develop a centralized command structure in the Arctic, a crucial aspect of its security policy.³³⁾Filijović M and Jardine S (2024) Russia’s Queenside Castling in the High North: A Strategic Risk or Opportunity for the West?. The Arctic Institute, 08 October, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-queenside-castling-high-north-strategic-risk-opportunity-west/. Accessed on 4 November 2024 It has only one significant base at Pituffik Space Base in Greenland, with two additional bases south of the Arctic Circle in Alaska.³⁴⁾Postler A (2019) Contextualizing Russia’s Arctic Militarization. Georgetown Security Studies Review, 18 February, https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2019/02/18/contextualizing-russias-arctic-militarization/. Accessed on 4 November 2024 The US has only two ocean-going icebreakers. There is a stark disparity in military presence between Russia and the US, a potential security dilemma. Russia’s action, and the US’s inaction, underscore the Arctic’s strategic importance and the urgency for a comprehensive security strategy.

Russia has fortified the region to protect future strategic and economic interests.³⁵⁾Peterson MB and Pincus R (2021) Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory. Orbis, 65(3): 490-512. Accessed on 3 November 2024 The US has interpreted this as an attempt to achieve regional dominance, prompting numerous military operations in the area.³⁶⁾Peterson MB and Pincus R (2021) Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory. Orbis, 65(3): 490-512. Accessed on 3 November 2024 Moscow views US actions as aggressive intrusions into Russian territory, which has led to further militarization on both sides.³⁷⁾Peterson MB and Pincus R (2021) Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory. Orbis, 65(3): 490-512. Accessed on 3 November 2024

This ongoing dynamic was exemplified when US Vice Admiral Lewis claimed that his fleet was prepared to secure sea lanes in the Atlantic and Arctic.³⁸⁾Peterson MB and Pincus R (2021) Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory. Orbis, 65(3): 490-512. Accessed on 3 November 2024 A Russian Duma member responded by stating that the US should not tempt fate and that the NSR and Arctic were Russia’s responsibility where Russian national interests are present.³⁹⁾Peterson MB and Pincus R (2021) Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory. Orbis, 65(3): 490-512. Accessed on 3 November 2024 The current US Grand Strategy has acted firmly but lacks consistent messaging. For example, in 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo decried Russian aggression in the Arctic, citing their regulations on NSR shipping, Arctic fortification, and actions in Ukraine.⁴⁰⁾Peterson MB and Pincus R (2021) Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory. Orbis, 65(3): 490-512. Accessed on 3 November 2024 However, Pompeo’s message lacked specificity about why the US felt threatened, simply stating that the US would host military exercises and increase its presence in the Arctic.⁴¹⁾Peterson MB and Pincus R (2021) Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory. Orbis, 65(3): 490-512. Accessed on 3 November 2024 The US must ensure that its actions in the Arctic are firm, predictable, consistent, and straightforward to avoid further escalating tensions.

The US must improve its messaging on Arctic security by clearly communicating its policies and red lines to Russia to avoid misinterpretations and unintended confrontations. However, it’s also important to recognize that the Arctic offers opportunities for cooperation. Enhanced communication can address immediate threats and foster stable regional collaboration. By improving its messaging strategy, the US can more effectively navigate the complex geopolitical landscape and reduce the risks of escalating tensions with Russia.

Economics

The future of the American Grand Strategy will be influenced by accessibility of the NSR and NWP, which has historically been limited due to short operational seasons (sea ice, weather) and limited infrastructure. These routes are, however, becoming viable with the NSR’s navigation season expected to extend from three to six months and the NWP’s from two to four months by 2100.⁴²⁾KhonVC et al (2010) Perspectives of Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage in the Twenty-First Century. Climatic Change, 100(3–4): 757–768, June, Accessed on 2 November 2024 If these projections hold, transporting goods from Europe to the Far East via the NSR could be 25 percent more profitable than the Suez Canal Route.⁴³⁾KhonVC et al (2010) Perspectives of Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage in the Twenty-First Century. Climatic Change, 100(3–4): 757–768, June, Accessed on 2 November 2024

The current shipping industry is already challenged. In 2023, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea led seven major shipping companies to alter their routes, resulting in fewer ships using the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, severe drought in Panama caused a 30 percent decrease in trade since November 2023.⁴⁴⁾The Economist (2024) How Viable is Arctic Shipping. The Economist, 18 January, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2024/01/18/how-viable-is-arctic-shipping. Accessed on 4 November 2024 These disruptions have led to a 283 percent increase in the cost of a 40-foot container transiting from PRC to northern Europe.⁴⁵⁾The Economist (2024) How Viable is Arctic Shipping. The Economist, 18 January, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2024/01/18/how-viable-is-arctic-shipping. Accessed on 4 November 2024 These challenges have highlighted the need for alternative shipping routes, making the Arctic routes increasingly important.

The future accessibility of the Arctic makes it more critical than ever however, the West’s investment is lagging.⁴⁶⁾Bennett M (2016) Is the Northwest Passage Too Small to Compete with the North Sea. Anchorage Daily, 29 June, https://www.adn.com/commentary/article/northwest-passage-too-small-compete-northern-sea/2011/08/25/. Accessed on 5 November 2024 In contrast, Russia has prioritized the development of the Arctic to attract traffic, particularly the NSR. From 2011 to 2015, the Russian Arctic doctrine focused on establishing new ports, customs facilities, and marine checkpoints along the Arctic Coastline.⁴⁷⁾Blunden M (2012) Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route. International Affairs, 88(1):115–129, 20 January. Accessed on 1 November 2024 Vladimir Putin has stressed the NSR’s strategic importance, and Russia’s development plan for 2035 includes $19 billion in infrastructure investments.⁴⁸⁾TASS Arctic Today (2023) Expert: Northern Sea Route May Become Russia’s Biggest Revenue Source in Arctic. TASS, 25 October, https://tass.com/economy/1696643. Accessed on 5 November 2024 These commitments underscore Russia’s recognition of the value of the NSR and the potential increase in cargo transport in the north.

The development of the NSR is also of interest to PRC, who referred to it as part of the Polar Silk Road in its 2018 Arctic White Paper and the 14^th Five-Year Plan.⁴⁹⁾Martins TT (2023) Arctic Ambitions: China’s Engagement with the Northern Sea Route. The Diplomat, 24 November, https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/arctic-ambitions-chinas-engagement-with-the-northern-sea-route. Accessed on 05 November 2024 Putin’s 2023 visit to PRC aimed to enhance the NSR’s integration into the Belt and Road Initiative.⁵⁰⁾Chen L and Soldatkin V (2023) Putin Praises Dear Friend Xi, Pitches Russia’s North Sea Route. Reuters, 18 October, https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-praises-xi-pitches-russias-northern-sea-route-2023-10-18/. Accessed on 5 November 2024 PRC’s NSR use has steadily increased, with transits rising from 27 in 2018 to 62 in 2020.⁵¹⁾Martins TT (2023) Arctic Ambitions: China’s Engagement with the Northern Sea Route. The Diplomat, 24 November, https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/arctic-ambitions-chinas-engagement-with-the-northern-sea-route. Accessed on 05 November 2024 The economic benefits, predicted to be 25 % greater than those of the Suez Canal Route, are also a significant driver of PRC’s growing NSR interest.⁵²⁾KhonVC et al (2010) Perspectives of Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage in the Twenty-First Century. Climatic Change, 100(3–4): 757–768, June, Accessed on 2 November 2024 PRC stands to gain significantly from Russian NSR, and Arctic expansion, in general.

In contrast, Europe and Japan have a more complicated view of the NSR. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there was a decline in NSR transit due to sanctions on Russia.⁵³⁾Hilde PS et al (2024) Cold Winds in the North: Three Perspectives on the Impact of Russia’s War in Ukraine on Security and International Relations in the Arctic. Polar Science 41: 101050, September. Accessed on 3 November 2024 However, by 2023, transits had rebounded, with increased transport of Russian LNG to Europe.⁵⁴⁾Hilde PS et al (2024) Cold Winds in the North: Three Perspectives on the Impact of Russia’s War in Ukraine on Security and International Relations in the Arctic. Polar Science 41: 101050, September. Accessed on 3 November 2024 Despite condemning Russia’s actions, Japan has not avoided the NSR, indicating that economic advantages often outweigh political considerations.

Shifting maritime traffic from the Suez Canal to the NSR requires the US to reevaluate trade routes and competitive strategies. As European and Asian partners increasingly use the NSR, they will need to maintain good relations with Russia, which could limit their willingness to oppose Russia, giving Russia a strategic advantage. The US must consider this shift in geopolitical power while also closely monitoring the growing partnership between Russia and the PRC in the Arctic.

Increased access to energy and mineral resources extraction due to ice melt, holds significant capacity for growth.⁵⁵⁾Sharma A (2021) China’s Polar Silk Road: Implications for the Arctic Region. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 25 October, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2820750/chinas-polar-silk-road-implications-for-the-arctic-region. Accessed on 1 November 2024 The area is home to 22 percent of the world’s resources, which includes up to 25 percent of unexplored oil and gas reserves. Despite having no Arctic land, PRC refers to itself as a “near Arctic state,” investing heavily in the region. In 2012, PRC invested $12 billion in the Russian Yamal LNG project after US sanctions left Russia short on funds.⁵⁶⁾Dillow C (2018) Russia and China Vie to Beat the US in the Trillion-Dollar Race to Control the Arctic. CNBC-Global Investing, 06 February, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/russia-and-china-battle-us-in-race-to-control-arctic.html. Accessed on 5 November 2024

Furthermore, in 2018, PRC signed an agreement to invest in Alaskan natural gas export facility,⁵⁷⁾Dillow C (2018) Russia and China Vie to Beat the US in the Trillion-Dollar Race to Control the Arctic. CNBC-Global Investing, 06 February, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/russia-and-china-battle-us-in-race-to-control-arctic.html. Accessed on 5 November 2024 and in 2019, Chinese companies purchased 10 percent ($5.6 billion) of the most prominent Russian natural gas producer.⁵⁸⁾Humpert M (2022) Chinese Shipping Company Cosco to Send Record Number of Ships Through Arctic. High North News, 13 September, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/chinese-shipping-company-cosco-send-record-number-ships-through-arctic. Accessed on 5 November 2024 PRC has unsuccessfully attempted to buy mines in Nunavut⁵⁹⁾Strong W (2020) Ottawa blocks Chinese Takeover of Nunavut Gold Mine Project After National Security Review. CBC News, 22 December, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/canada-china-tmac-1.5851305. Accessed on 5 November 2024 and recently increased research and land acquisition efforts in the Svalbard.⁶⁰⁾Agence France-Press (2024) Norway Blocks Sale of Last Private Land on Svalbard After Chinese Interest. The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/01/norway-blocks-sale-last-private-land-svalbard-china-interest. Accessed on 5 November 2024 PRC is clearly committed to Arctic resources.

The Arctic’s growing accessibility is changing global trade and economics, necessitating an adaptation of US grand strategy. Considering the potential opportunities and challenges posed by Russia’s and China’s growing commercial influence, the Arctic will play a crucial role in future global trade, resource extraction, and international relations, making it a key consideration for American strategic planning.

Conclusion

Arctic development and policies have transitioned from cooperative to competitive due to Russian development, militarization, and the PRC’s expanding influence, necessitating a recalibrated US grand strategy. The 2022 US National Strategy for the Arctic Region presented a comprehensive response, prioritizing security, climate resilience, sustainable development, and international governance. Its multi-pronged approach, emphasizing the immediate need for a unified NATO Arctic strategy, furthers US interests and aligns military, economic, and environmental policies among Arctic NATO members.

When engaging Russia, the US must present a strong deterrent while pursuing selective diplomatic efforts on shared concerns such as environmental protection and accident prevention. This balanced strategy, valuing both strength and diplomacy, is necessary to reduce the risk of miscalculations. At the same time, strengthening the US role in multilateral forums like the Arctic Council is essential to counter PRC’s influence and prevent it from gaining leverage as a self-proclaimed “near-Arctic” stakeholder.

Climate change will create shipping opportunities and natural resource access, accompanied by the potential for economic growth and strategic challenges. In navigating this evolving landscape, the US strives to balance energy, security, and environmental protection but conflicting interests complicate policy coherence. Political changes and stakeholder sentiment can significantly shape strategy, often resulting in abrupt shifts. Maintaining consistency is crucial, especially as environmental issues increasingly intersect with energy independence and national security.

Security remains central to US strategy, but vulnerabilities exist due to military and infrastructure gaps. Russia’s aggressive Arctic buildup contrasts with the US’s limited fleet and infrastructure. The US relies on strengthening alliances, mainly through NATO, which Sweden now reinforces and Finland’s membership. Balancing defense, diplomacy, and coalition-building is vital to safeguarding US interests and Arctic stability. The US can shape the Arctic’s future through strategic investments and leadership, ensuring alignment between national security, environmental, and economic goals.

Going forward, the 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy implements essential initiatives of the 2022 Arctic Strategy. It strengthens grand strategy by identifying the Arctic as a critical arena for power projection, alliance strengthening, climate adaptation, and resilience. Its’ approach forms a cohesive response to Russian aggression and build-up, PRC ambition, collaboration between Russia and PRC, the addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO and climate change. To that end, it supports improved Arctic capabilities, force readiness for high latitude operations, and deeper engagement with Allies.⁶¹⁾US Department of Defense (2024) 2024 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy. Department of Defense, June, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Accessed on 19 December Given adequate resources and a functioning joined-up government, the DoD strategy will help maintain stability and security in the Arctic.

Kiel Pechko is a M.A. graduate from Seton Hall University’s School of Diplomacy & International Relations specializing in International Security and Europe.