China’s Yellow River Arctic Station on Svalbard, 2010. Photo: Eating the Sun

China’s role in the Arctic continues to be an important research focus in 2025. The Arctic Institute’s 2025 Series on China’s role in the Arctic presents over a dozen original articles from international scholars that help elucidate China’s growing Arctic activities. This series builds on our previous China series from 2020 and 2023.

Over the past few decades, China’s interest in the Arctic has increased and been shaped by economic, political, scientific and environmental interests. First joining the International Arctic Science Committee in 1996, China has long been involved in polar research and has conducted polar expeditions with its Xue Long icebreaker vessel. China established the Yellow River Station in 2004 in Svalbard, Norway, to conduct climatic studies and became an observer state to the Arctic Council in 2013, only allowing China’s participation in working groups but not in the negotiation of agreements in the institution. China declared itself a “near Arctic state” in 2018 with the publication of its Arctic Policy, a white paper that outlines China’s interests in the Arctic. The document presents China’s interests in scientific, economic, and governance activities in the region and calls the Arctic the “common heritage of humankind.”

The articles in the series center on two core themes: (1) China’s Arctic engagement in the context of great power competition and global geopolitics, and (2) China’s Arctic engagement in local and regional socioeconomic structures. The series explores China’s relationship with Russia, U.S. alarm over China’s Arctic engagement, opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation, and China’s role in Arctic governance. Moreover, the series explores the normative foundations of China’s Arctic activities, China’s sub-regional cooperation with Russia, China’s work in satellite and subsea cable infrastructure, and Chinese interests in rare earth minerals.

The research presented in this series advances remarkable conclusions. Authors argue against the Western Arctic states’ alarm over China’s role in the Arctic and rather consider the opportunities for cooperation with China. PAN Min and Henry P. Huntington consider a framework of “selective cooperation” for China and the seven Western Arctic states. LI Xiaoning argues that sub-regional Arctic cooperation is a “strategic stabilizer” that can reduce the fluctuations in the relations between major powers. Barry Zellen argues that the U.S. portrayal of China as a threat to the Arctic is rooted not in strategic reality, but in paranoia and an anti-China ideological bias. In contrast, Erdem Lamazhapov and Andreas Østhagen encourage the U.S. to pay more attention to China’s growing role in the Bering Sea and North Pacific Ocean.

Authors note that much academic and policy attention has been paid to the Sino-Russian partnership, but issues of territorial sovereignty (among other issues) remain points of contention in this relationship. Roman Zhilin emphasizes divergence in the fundamental views of Russia and China in their Arctic relationship and how the two countries support limited situational cooperation. Abbas Qaidari applies a game-theory analysis of China–Russia Arctic cooperation to show how uncertainty drives divergent behavior.

Authors argue that China’s role in other parts of the world, development of digital infrastructure, and competition for critical minerals have lessons for understanding China’s Arctic activities. Abeeha Shamshad argues that China’s Arctic engagement can be understood by considering the experience of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan. Aybala Lale Kahraman explores the role of satellite and subsea cable infrastructure in China’s digitizing of its position in Arctic great power competition. Gørild M. Heggelund, Iselin Stensdal and Erdem Lamazhapov explore what the competition for critical minerals means for China’s role in the Arctic.

Authors examine the normative foundations of China’s Arctic strategy and debate whether it is a hybrid warfare campaign that aims to expand China’s influence and reshape Arctic governance or whether China aims to present itself as a reliable partner. Riva Panchal argues that China’s Arctic strategy is a hybrid practice of influence grounded in pragmatic investment, diplomatic signaling, and normative flexibility. Sampo Sanaksenaho examines how China’s discourses of multilateralism, respect and convergence serve China’s long-term strategic and normative ambitions in the Arctic. Zoha Fatima argues that China is exploiting the governance gap left by the United States and subtly reshaping the Arctic governance agenda by presenting itself as a stable, sustainable, and globally engaged actor. Juliana Rapper argues that China is targeting the Arctic Council, exploiting governance fractures and advancing alternative normative frameworks that challenge the existing order. In general, the series presents disparate perspectives on the nature of China’s Arctic activities. The diverse collection of articles seeks to present a holistic view of China’s role in the Arctic.

Pavel Devyatkin is a Senior Associate at The Arctic Institute.